Where the science went wrong

scientific caution, rather than a strategy of “herd immunity”, drove the UK’s slow response...

Sage agreeing “to publish a chronological set ... documents which have informed the questions it has considered and its advice to date... to demonstrate the uncertainties scientists have faced, how understanding of Covid-19 has developed over time, and the science behind the advice at each stage”...

several specialist sub-groups, largely ... academics, funnelling advice ... weighted ... senior figures ... government’s own advisory network... NHS and Public Health England ... Cummings was never a member ... reported to have attended only four meetings ...

“herd immunity”... this was never an objective... aim was to prevent people from becoming infected ... measures seeking to completely suppress ... will cause a second peak ... limited capacity ... test and trace ... not going to be enough ...

stringent measures ... Sage doubted ... would enable it to contain the epidemic. By 25 February, it was more optimistic... Yet there were doubts ... the measures would have to last for weeks ... very difficult to implement ... little sense of how public attitudes could quickly shift, as anxiety generated demands that the government push on ... the real possibility that the NHS would be overwhelmed ... move to lockdown ... transmission in care homes ... only ... addressed as it became evident that the statistics had been missing ... major consequences ... death toll & epidemic’s curve ...

when demands for transparency are met there is often a surprising lack of interest in exploring what has been disclosed...

Sage’s ... very data-driven... fine had the data been readily available and timely... until late April, it had only patchy information ...